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I. Introduction
Thank you very much. It is an honor to be at SMU today to participate in the dedication
of the Sir Joseph Gold Library Collection and to discuss International Monetary and Fi-
nancial Law in the New Millennium. Sir Joseph is an impressive and remarkable role model
to which all of us in the public and academic sectors should aspire. At the outset, I need to
tell you that the opinions I will express are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Federal Reserve.
II. Dollarization
Today, I am going to talk about dollarization and its possible implications for U.S. law
and U.S. lawyers. At the very beginning, let me share a basic premise: law reform is driven
by changing business conditions. Dollarization is the adoption of U.S. money as the money
of another country. This, in my view, is a dramatic change in a business condition. Given
how interconnected our U.S. economy is with our neighbors in this hemisphere - and I'm
sure I don't have to emphasize this to an audience in Dallas - it's safe to say that dollarization
is an issue that cuts across geographical boundaries both outside and inside the United
States. I predict that dollarization will have a significant effect on the development of U.S.
law, and on those who practice it, whether they are here or abroad. This is the theme of
my remarks today.
There are examples of countries that have been "dollarized" for some time. Most notably,
U.S. dollar bills have been used exclusively in Panama for much of this century, as an
outgrowth of U.S. involvement in Panama from the time of the Panama Canal. More
recently, both Ecuador and now El Salvador have enacted legislation adopting the dollar
as their currency and sanctioning its use as legal tender in their countries.
There are other numerous examples of countries where the dollar has - by law, policy,
or necessity - become widely used and accepted. After the Soviet Union's break-up, dollars
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began to be used widely in Russia and the former Soviet Republics as a safe currency; in
these and many more jurisdictions, people want dollars because their own currencies are
so volatile. In Argentina, when the peso was introduced after a long period ofhyperinflation,
the domestic currency was pegged on a one-to-one basis with the U.S. dollar. As a result,
the dollar is used virtually interchangeably with the peso today in Buenos Aires.
I do not intend to state any position on whether the United States - or, indeed, any
country or region - should encourage or discourage the use of its currency as legal tender
in another country. But it is important to note that the policy and mechanics of dollarization
are subjects of legislation in the U.S. Congress and have initiated an interesting debate over
how our country, and particularly those of us who help implement U.S. monetary policy,
should react.
When countries dollarize, whether unofficially or officially, their banks and populations
need physical currency - Federal Reserve notes. To bring it down to the most obvious level,
the head of a household purchasing vegetables from the greengrocer needs to pay with
money. Institutions and people need to convert their old money into dollars. Banks tend
to obtain dollars in one of three ways: (1) directly from Federal Reserve Banks in the United
States (transporting the currency by courier across borders); (2) from Extended Custodial
Inventories (ECI), which are currency vaults that are operated for the Federal Reserve in
foreign countries by private entities; or (3) from commercial depository institutions who
provide money services.
When U.S. dollars are obtained, they will be exchanged with the local currency being
replaced by the dollars. Over time - and there is significant debate now as to how much
time is reasonable - the local currency will be completely displaced by the dollar. We have
an interesting experiment along these lines that will soon take place in the European Com-
munity, where local currencies (such as deutsche marks or French franc) will be displaced
by the euro note. This is scheduled to take no longer than eight weeks. For the sake of our
discussion, we may use this eight-week period as a rule of thumb.
lIM. Banking and Payments Infrastructure
Once the dollar has displaced the local currency, it will be freely used in the local econ-
omy. As dollars pass from individuals to the greengrocers, there will come a point when
people will wish to store those dollars, not in the proverbial mattress, but in the safety and
security of the local bank. This will inevitably lead to the creation of dollar-denominated
bank balances in bank accounts outside of the United States.
It is a fact of modem life that people soon come to realize that "payment" in its most
basic form consists of a delivery of legal tender "on the barrelhead." In fact, this is perhaps
one of the finest icons of the law merchant, the vision of legal tender being passed on the
barrelhead from consumer to merchant. If you close your eyes, you can actually see that
taking place in a small country store in Laredo.
But in the modem day, we know that this type of payment is unwise. First, it is just not
safe to walk around with legal tender in your pocket, either in Laredo, New York City, or
Quito. It invites all the wrong sorts of attention. Second, it is expensive to deal in currency.
Shop owners around the world know that some part of the currency being passed across
that barrelhead never actually makes it into the till because the shop workers have an
altogether human tendency to put some of it in their own pockets. Third, money in the
bank tends to earn interest. By comparison, money in the till is simply a risk with no return.
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Why do I digress along these lines? To make the point that it is only a matter of time
before people in a dollarized economy start to think about how to effect "payment" by
transferring a dollar-denominated bank balance from the buyer's bank to the seller's bank,
instead of passing cash across the barrelhead. This is probably not a startling observation
to anyone here; and isn't it characteristic of a lawyer to think that it is profound to discover
that rain is wet? But what is much less clear today is what legal infrastructure will govern
dollar-denominated payments outside of the United States. If we all agree that these pay-
ments are just around the corner, isn't this an important question?
IV. Legal Infrastructure
In the United States, we have a very elaborate set of laws that constitutes our legal
infrastructure for payments. We have Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) for checks, supplemented by the federal Expedited Funds Availability Act.I We have
Article 4A of the UCC for funds transfers, which works in conjunction with two Federal
laws - the Expedited Funds Availability Act and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act.2 I would
be inexcusably incomplete if I failed to mention the alphabet soup of Federal Reserve
regulations. We have Regulations J3 and CC4 for checks. Regulation El exists for consumer
electronic funds transfers. Finally, we have credit cards, which are governed by the Truth
in Lending Act' and the Federal Reserve's Regulation Z.7
Trust me - this is a pretty elaborate legal infrastructure. What often surprises me is that
people take legal infrastructure for granted in the United States. It is one of those many
things that work so well that you can freely ignore it. Like turning on the television set, it
works - so who cares how? But when we have dollar-denominated payments outside of the
United States, will they work well without the legal infrastructure that we all take for
granted?
Some of my monetary legal colleagues will take solace in the Latin expression lex monitae.
They will invoke that concept like an amulet that will fend off the evil law god who might
strike at the dollarized sovereign who establishes a payment system without a proper legal
infrastructure. Lex monitae is a principle that says you apply the law of the jurisdiction issuing
the currency to resolve any payment-related legal question. So, if you have a check denom-
inated in U.S. dollars, you apply U.S. payment law to resolve a legal question about handling
the check. The utility of the concept is that it answers all "which payment law applies"
questions. But some answers are just too simple. I am not particularly confident that lex
monitae is the answer to legal issues related to payment in dollarized jurisdictions. I think
it is politically naive and practically unworkable to expect foreign countries to slavishly
convert to U.S. law. Can you imagine how some of the finer textual points in the beautifully
written Regulation Z will translate into Spanish and Portuguese? I suspect that you see this
point. I also think that it is unrealistic to expect foreign judges to apply U.S. law regularly
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1991).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1996).
3. 12 C.F.R. § 210 (2001).
4. Id. § 229.
5. Id. § 205.
6. Pub. L. 90-321 (West 2000).
7. 12 C.F.R. § 226.
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to payment disputes if they are uncomfortable with the outcome produced by the appli-
cation.
But I cannot stop with that, because it is absolutely clear to me that you cannot have two
incompatible legal infrastructures for the transfer of dollar-denominated bank balances.
Why? To give you an answer, I want you to think not about payments, but about driving
an automobile. Now, when you drive an automobile you need to follow certain rules of the
road. One of those rules in the United States is that you drive your car on the right-hand
side of the road. In the island nations of Great Britain and Ireland, you know that they
drive on the left-hand side of the road. The different rules work well so long as no driver
crosses a border at high speed. Imagine if you will, what might happen if Canada followed
the British rule. We would undoubtedly have multi-car pile-ups routinely along our north-
ern border. I submit the same principle is true with respect to cross-border payment flows.
Dollar-denominated bank balances may pass across national borders, but there must be
harmony in the rules of the road that exist in the respective localities.
V. Areas for Harmonization
Assuming you are with me on the need for some harmonization, I will now turn to what
I believe are two very fertile areas for study of, and coordination with, foreign legal systems:
dollar payment systems and criminal law.
A. DOLLAR-PAYMENT SYSTEMS
As payment systems for dollar-denominated balances emerge in places like Ecuador, El
Salvador, and Argentina, there will also be a need to transfer these balances to, through,
and from the United States. Commerce will push for links among dollar-payment systems
in these jurisdictions. Different legal rules create uncertainties about the rights and obli-
gations of parties wishing to engage in cross-border activities - even if they involve a single
currency. The reason is that payment systems operate most safely and efficiently within a
clear legal framework, and having two or three, or even four legal frameworks apply to a
funds transfer within a linked payment system invites a high degree of legal uncertainty. To
return to my driving metaphor, the risk of colliding cross-border funds transfers rises with
the number of dollarized jurisdictions.
For example, consider a dollar transfer involving an Originator in Country A and a
Beneficiary in Country B. A dispute over the payment arises. What law governs the rights
and obligations of the Originator and Beneficiary (not to mention the banks used to carry
out the transfer)? If, say, the Originator obtains a judgment against the Beneficiary in Coun-
try A under Country A's law, but the Beneficiary's assets are held in Country B, will a court
in Country B enforce the Country A judgment?
As we can see, even with the widespread use of a single currency, it is easy to crash into
familiar choice-of-law and enforceability questions. The dilemma worsens if one or both
of the countries do not have the legal rules or infrastructure capable of resolving payment-
system disputes rapidly and predictably. If that is the case, then the participants in the
payment systems, their banks, and the payment systems themselves will suffer as a result of
a lack of legal certainty and confidence in adjudication.
In this regard, there is a very interesting comparison to make between dollarization and
the introduction of the euro in the European Community. In the European Community,
there have been euro bank balances long before the distribution of a common, physical
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currency, which enabled the creation of their "Target" payment system before any euro was
ever printed. In contrast, in the United States and dollarized countries, a common, physical
currency will predate linked payment systems for transferring dollar-denominated bank
balances. But this difference will not last for long. I predict there will be pressure to link
these new, offshore payment systems to our long-established payment systems here in this
country - with the goal of enabling borderless dollar-denominated payments.
What do I think will happen in dollarized countries? Some basic principles of U.S. pay-
ments law will end up in these nations, as a result of the United States "pushing" our legal
framework and/or dollarized countries "pulling in" U.S. law to meet the demands of com-
merce. I doubt that the flow of U.S. law to dollarized countries - either as a result of our
exporting it or their importing it - will extend to laws that commercial lawyers would regard
as consumer-protection measures. So, I could see the United States exporting UCC Article
4A with respect to funds transfer, but probably not Regulation Z with respect to credit
cards. In this regard, the European Community has already adopted some principles of
Article 4A in its Directives on Cross-Border Credit Transfers and Settlement Finality in
Payment & Securities Settlement Systems.
How is this likely to happen? My sense is that it will happen because business people will
ask their lawyers to make it happen. In this regard, we are just starting to see groups of
lawyers from countries in North and South America getting together to consider the legal
issues associated with dollarization, and the various ways in which they might be resolved.
Later this year, the Mexican Central Bank, together with the Monetary Law Committee of
the International Law Association, will hold a conference in Mexico City dealing with this
very topic.
B. CRIMINAL LAW
While I believe that dollarization will drive the development of payment law - and I
hope my example convinces you of that - it will also pressure other law reform efforts.
Consider what might be the area of law that is most territorial - criminal law. Dollarization
increases the use of the dollar. As dollars are used by more people, the temptation to
counterfeit and the harmful effects of counterfeiting also will increase. Dollarization might
put pressure on U.S. law enforcement agencies to export their technology and techniques
to stop counterfeiters abroad.
Is it against U.S. law to counterfeit U.S. banknotes in a dollarized country like Ecuador
or El Salvador? Yes. But absent close international law enforcement cooperation, it may be
difficult for U.S. authorities to apprehend, extradite, and punish perpetrators in addition
to preventing counterfeiters from quickly moving their operations elsewhere.
Perhaps we should be focusing just as intently on whether it is illegal under Ecuadorian
or El Salvadoran law to counterfeit U.S. currency and on what motivation and resources
dollarized countries have to prevent and catch counterfeiters. Already this country devotes
substantial resources to helping foreign law enforcement officials eradicate illegal drugs
grown in South America: are we willing to devote resources to, say, the eradication of
counterfeiting U.S. currency outside the United States? Just as dollarization might cause
exporting U.S. payment law to foreign dollar-payment systems, it may also "push" our law
enforcement infrastructure offshore, into unknown and uncomfortable territory. Does it
strike you as strange to contemplate an Ecuadorian prosecution of an Ecuadorian national
for violating an Ecuadorian criminal law by counterfeiting Federal Reserve notes?
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VI. Potential Problems from Dollarization
These payment system and criminal law issues raised by the trend toward dollarization
should, and in fact do, pose real concerns for central bankers like me. After all, it is part of
our job to worry about what my former colleague Jerry Corrigan, who was President of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, called financial "plumbing." Moreover, as a lawyer
for the U.S. central bank, I fear that an increase in unresolved commercial disputes or
uncertainty involving this country's currency, even if they occur outside our borders, could
adversely affect us.
But that is just one possible problem. Payment system problems will probably have the
worst effect on emerging-market countries that adopt the dollar in a rush to stabilize their
economies and make themselves competitive in an increasingly global economy, but without
the necessary legal infrastructure. We commonly worry about financial "contagion": for
example, the possibility that economic troubles in Turkey will spill over into Argentina,
which has been in the headlines just recently. I am no economist, but there is a risk that
dollarization will not mitigate contagion. In fact, without a protective legal infrastructure,
it might hasten the spread of liquidity crises across borders and into economies that inves-
tors have not perceived as shaky.
I have also said nothing about operations risk and information technology. For example,
the computer systems that drive our wholesale payment systems in the United States are
highly sophisticated and robust. What do we expect will happen in poorer countries like
Ecuador? If their systems ultimately link to ours in the United States, will there be possible
technological fallout? Similarly, on the law enforcement front, if dollarization leads to
greater corruption and other criminal activities, then that will detract from any economic
benefit derived from the use of a common currency by the United States and other dollar-
ized countries.
VII. Possible Solutions
So how can we - and by that I mean academics, financial institutions, central banks,
international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, and the public at large
- best grapple with these concerns? Well, for one, our best protection is to anticipate these
problems rather than merely react to them. I believe that central banks in particular need
to be involved as developers of payments law and payment systems rather than as passive
observers so that we can design a sound legal infrastructure that will allow them to flourish.
I hope that we can all agree on the importance of successfully linking payment systems and
law enforcement initiatives focused on the dollar in order to sustain and improve legitimate
trade and economic development, as well as - dare I say it - international harmony.
VIII. Conclusion
In closing, let me return to my premise, that changing business conditions drive law
reform. Dollarization is a business condition that will turn the attention of American lawyers
outward, whether they are payment lawyers or criminal lawyers. Regrettably, I never had
the opportunity to study with, or ever meet, Sir Joseph Gold. However, from what I know
about him, I am confident he would urge us to look outwardly and embrace change. I can
think of no better way to memorialize SirJoseph than to pledge my intention to aggressively
study the legal issues associated with dollarization, and to try to resolve them.
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